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Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual
Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs
Debora Halbert
INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the South African government passed the South African
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act Amendments in order to
address the problems associated with delivering AIDS medication to the
millions of South Africans with HIV/AIDS.  The scope of the act was
modest, allowing the Minister of Health to make affordable medication avail-
able to protect public health.1  However, the act was immediately interpreted
as a threat to the patents of international pharmaceutical companies that pro-
vide AIDS medication on the international market.  These companies
responded by filing a lawsuit against the South African government, which
sparked worldwide debate.  The fight spawned a public relations campaign
on the part of the world’s most powerful corporations, which led to a
concerted effort by the U.S. government to halt South Africa’s attempt to
provide AIDS medication to its citizens.
Despite resistance on the part of major pharmaceutical companies and the
U.S. government, the issue of AIDS in South Africa will not be ignored.
AIDS infection rates in Africa and the death tolls caused by this disease are
mind numbing in scope.  According to UNAIDS, approximately 28.5 mil-
lion people in sub-Saharan Africa have HIV.2  Of these millions of people,
less than 25,000 are receiving antiretroviral treatment.3  It is estimated that
4.7 million people in South Africa alone have AIDS4 and almost 20% of
adults in South Africa have HIV.5  Some communities have infection rates as
high as 70%,6 and according to James Love, the Director of the Consumer
Project on Technology, 20,000 people die each month in South Africa from
AIDS.7  The number of children with AIDS is heartbreaking, with estimates
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of at least 95,000 children in South Africa infected.8  While many children
have the disease, even more have been left orphaned because of AIDS and
the number of orphans is threatening to overwhelm communities.
Africa generally, and South Africa specifically, are facing a crisis of
almost unimaginable proportions.  African nations are experiencing short-
ages in teachers and health care staff as the virus takes its toll.9  The disease
has hit all sectors of society, but women and the poor are the most likely to
be affected.10  It is not an exaggeration to claim that entire nations are at risk
of extinction if the problem is not systematically addressed.11  The problem
has been ignored for too long, and the social costs have reached crisis levels.
Additionally, because risk of infection has been on the decline in the U.S.,
the perceived urgency of the problem for U .S. lawmakers has been reduced.12
As a result, it has become easier for the developed world to ignore the
problem.  Thus, when the South African Medicines Act was introduced it
quickly resulted in battle lines being drawn between patent rights and public
health.  While all parties acknowledged the scope of the AIDS crisis, how to
go about solving the problem became the subject of significant moral and
legal debate.
The South African AIDS controversy is important for many reasons.  First,
this debate finally brought world attention to the enormous impact of AIDS
in Africa, a situation that has been ignored for far too long.  Second, the use
of treatment as a prevention strategy for solving the AIDS crisis is now
considered legitimate.  Previously, pharmaceutical companies had been suc-
cessful in convincing many policy makers that treatment was an unworkable
solution in Africa.  Third, and the focus of this paper, activists have success-
fully opened a hole in the intellectual property discourse, and have begun the
process of providing an alternative to the idea of strong intellectual property.
This new language advocates parallel importation, compulsory licensing
agreements, and a reinvigorated discourse asserting health care as a moral
and human right.13
The rejection of the Medicines Act by the U.S. government and the
pharmaceutical industry suggests that they are willing to extend patent law
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to unconscionable levels.  In contrast, AIDS activists around the world are
not only trying to provide necessary medication, but are also trying to make
it possible to evaluate access to medication as a human right instead of a
property right.  I will argue that within patent law, compulsory licenses and
parallel importation allow for the protection of patent rights while also pro-
viding easier access to medication.  It is necessary to include health care as a
human right with the language of property rights.  Instead of seeing the only
alternatives as absolute patent protection or no protection at all, it is possible
to develop a middle path that would promote the use of compulsory licenses
and parallel importation to overcome the drug pricing problems.  However,
if parallel importation and compulsory licenses cannot provide necessary
access to medication at an affordable price, then the paradigm of health care
as a human right must prevail.  In the U.S., trespass does not legitimate the
death of the trespasser to protect the integrity of a property right; so too the
death of millions from AIDS should not be the result of absolute intellectual
property rights protection.
It is first necessary to understand the predominant paradigm associated
with international intellectual property rights in order to understand the
success of AIDS activists in developing an alternative paradigm with health
care as a human right as its essential premise.  In essence, the 1997 South
African Medicines Act was necessary because international pharmaceutical
companies had successfully scripted the discourse of patent rights to favor
an absolutist position that made it impossible to provide medication to the
poor throughout the global south.  Thus, the narrative of access to AIDS
medication has consistently been framed within the language of property
rights.  In the first section of the paper, I will investigate the structure of this
narrative and the claims upon which it is based.  Second, I will trace the
significant events that contributed to the success of an alternative discourse
emphasizing health care as a human right over the property rights of patent
owners.  Finally, I will assess the political implications of developing viable
alternatives to a strong intellectual property model.  The struggle between
the competing interests details the variety of dimensions of intellectual
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property law that fall between absolute protection and no protection at all,
and these different perspectives should be explored.
CONSTRUCTING VICTIMS: THE POLITICS OF ACCESS TO MEDICATION
There are several strategies for addressing AIDS.  There is a virtual
consensus on the importance of education in preventing future infection, and
that currently there is a lack of educational mechanisms regarding AIDS.
However, controversy emerges over the use of medication to treat AIDS in
Africa, and the developing world generally.  Wealthier nations have brought
AIDS under control through a combination of education and drugs.  Much of
the success of AIDS reduction in the United States has been attributed to the
development of drug cocktails, a combination of AIDS medications that, taken
together, allows someone with AIDS to live a fairly normal life.
The drug cocktail that has been so successful for Americans is a combina-
tion of antiretrovirals known as HAART.  This mix of medications is a highly
active antiretroviral therapy that reduces the virus to almost undetectable
levels, thus helping reduce the risk of spreading the disease.14  These cock-
tails are very expensive, around $12,000/year for an American.15  When the
average African nation spends $10/year/person on medical care,16 the $12,000
price tag is simply too expensive for any but the most wealthy world citizens
to afford.  In addition to the combination of antiretrovirals necessary to fight
the infection and reduce the transfer of the disease, there are AIDS medica-
tions that are also necessary–drugs required in order to reduce the impact of
opportunistic infections and deal with pain.17  Given the expense involved in
providing AIDS medication, most international strategies have focused on
prevention and education instead of challenging the high costs of the drugs
and providing treatment.
The debate over how to deal with HIV/AIDS in its present context must
involve access to available medications.  These medications have been proven
to work in the Western world and many developing countries feel they should
be made available at prices their citizens can afford.  India and Brazil have
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generic drug industries that are able to produce cheaper AIDS medication,
and the South African legislation was intended to give them the power to
develop access to these cheaper alternatives as well.  The pharmaceutical
industry’s reaction to these attempts has been to assert their patent paradigm
as the only viable way in which to produce medication to solve the world’s
most prominent diseases.
The South African example shows that the laws of intellectual property,
and the assumptions used to justify strong intellectual property protection,
take on the power of an ideology used to filter decisions.  The pharmaceuti-
cal industry argues that they are in the business of producing life-saving drugs
that will only be developed if the incentive to create new products remains
intact.  In this section, I will examine the narrative constructed by the phar-
maceutical industry to claim ownership over patented drugs.  At one level,
this narrative is a struggle over who gets to define moral and immoral
behavior.  At another level, the basic assumptions about patents used by the
pharmaceutical industry to justify their actions clearly illustrate how power-
ful intellectual property has become as an ideology.  If you “steal” property,
you are a thief and if you create a form of property that is a public good,
you are a hero.
Over the past two decades, intellectual property owners have aggressively
lobbied for domestic and international laws to protect intellectual property
rights.  The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agree-
ment is one of the most recent and far reaching victories by intellectual
property owners who wish to see their rights protected globally.  The TRIPS
agreement was the result of a strategy whereby pharmaceutical companies
defined themselves as the “victims” of immoral and malicious “pirates” and
“thieves.”  Developing countries that violated intellectual property rights were
not only engaged in unfair trade, they were morally bankrupt.  Within the
intellectual property discourse, morality is defined as adhering to the law,
and according to this definition, violating intellectual property laws is
inexcusable.
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The pharmaceutical industry was active in asserting their idea of
intellectual property globally as early as the mid-80’s.  As Robert
Weissman explains,
By 1985, the pharmaceutical industry was on the offensive, in an
effort to force Third World countries to adopt U.S.-style patent laws.
While the industry attempted to directly persuade Third World policy
makers of the merits of guaranteeing strict patent protection, its main
strategy was to persuade U.S. policy makers to coerce Third World
countries to adopt restrictive patent rules.18
The industry successfully influenced U.S. policy by opening revolving doors
between the patent and trademark office, key governing boards in the U.S.,
and industry jobs.19
The close link between industry and government influenced the develop-
ment of the U.S. position on intellectual property, and was instrumental in
getting IP rights included in the GATT negotiations.20  Weissman argues that
the industry gained significant traction on the issue of intellectual property
by developing a “rights” discourse.21  Once the idea of “rights” to property in
the global environment was accepted, the pharmaceutical companies solic-
ited the help of the computer software and entertainment industry to assist
them in shaping the international agenda as a quest to protect the victims of
world piracy.22  Multinational corporations defined their own behavior as moral
when they successfully claimed they were defenseless from the theft and
piracy of immoral countries.  The narration of victimhood and piracy used to
support a strong international intellectual property regime is illustrated in
the statements by Ambassador, and previous U.S. Trade Representative
under Ronald Regan, Clayton K. Yeutter who testified before Congress in
1996 on the necessity of strong intellectual property protection.  His testi-
mony is worth reproducing at length:
Today, the market for new products and technology extends far
beyond our shores.  It has expanded into every corner of the globe.
But if American firms are to take advantage of newfound global
demand for their products, they must rely on foreign governments
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to protect their valuable intellectual property rights.  Often, foreign
governments fall short, leaving U.S. owners of intellectual property
defenseless against piracy.  In these situations, the fruits of Ameri-
can innovation are lost, since it is a simple matter to copy most
artistic works or technological advances in countries like India,
Russia, or China.
In response to pleas from American companies, artists, and
inventors for action to address proliferating global piracy, the
United States a decade ago forced intellectual property rights onto
the Uruguay Round agenda.  But for our unremitting pressure, the
more than one hundred countries who participated in the Round
would not have negotiated stronger rules and disciplines.  It was the
United States which understood, more than anyone, that uniform
protection of intellectual property rights around the world would
promote the expansion of international trade, global economic
growth, and job creation . . . And until the final stages of the nego-
tiations, many of our trading partners wanted weak or non-existent
global intellectual property standards, generous exemptions for
developing countries, or the indefinite postponement of multilateral
rules so that their local pirates could continue copying American
pharmaceuticals, films, sound recordings, software, and books.
Fortunately, the outcome was a disappointment for the “purveyors
of piracy.”23
Yeutter condenses a decade of negotiations into a clear morality play in which
the United States is the guiding light to the world; the U.S. has understood,
“more than anyone,” the importance of intellectual property rights and has
prevailed against governments supporting “pirates.”  In this narrative, there
are no legitimate reasons for resisting the U.S. position, and in fact the
reasons given by the developing world are not discussed as rational at all.
Instead, it is assumed they are “purveyors of piracy.”  Because of this one-
sided narrative, the U.S. is in the heroic position of listening to the “pleas” of
victimized innocents who are “defenseless” at the hands of foreign govern-
ments and pirates.  From Yeutter’s statements, and others who share his
perspective, the global narrative is established with the moral terrain staked
out in favor of multinationals.24
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Monopolizing the language of victimhood has allowed the pharma-
ceutical industry to claim it suffers whenever laws sympathetic to public health
and human welfare are passed.  While millions of Africans are being dis-
criminated against, it is the pharmaceutical industry that claims to suffer when
attention is focused on making these medicines available.  Even as pharma-
ceutical companies become the wealthiest corporations in the world,25
they continue to position themselves as the victims of unjustified “piracy”
and discrimination.
The U.S. government asserts, along with industry, that without strong
protective measures there would be no incentive to produce new life-saving
drugs.26  The USTR publicly sided with strong intellectual property laws in
May of 2001 when it reported to the President that AIDS should only be
addressed within the framework of intellectual property rights.
The Administration has informed countries that as they take steps
to address a major health crisis like the HIV/AIDS crisis in sub-
Saharan Africa, they should be able to avail themselves of the
flexibilities afforded by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), provided that any
steps they take comply with the provisions of the TRIPS Agree-
ment. The Administration is equally committed to a policy of
promoting intellectual property protection, including for pharma-
ceutical patents, because of its critical role in the rapid innovation,
development, and commercialization of effective and safe drug
therapies. 27
While the statement recognizes the importance of intellectual property in
creating drugs, it ignores evidence that publicly funded support for innova-
tion is crucial to the development of most drugs.  It assumes the government
can do nothing to inspire innovation through funding and that research and
development is solely in the hands of organizations that only create when
absolute protection is guaranteed.28
  The industry implies that if their monopoly rights are threatened, they
will not invest money in new research.29  This not-so-subtle threat is present
in the statements of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President of PhRMA (the
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primary pharmaceutical lobbying group), at a 1996 Senate hearing on
pharmaceutical patents. Mossinghoff blames American laws and a competi-
tive environment for weakening the incentive to pursue life-saving research:
One thing remains unchanged between then and now: the critical
need of patients for cures that can only be developed through high-
risk, high-cost pharmaceutical research.  Cancer, AIDS, Alzheimer’s
and other diseases continue to take an unacceptable human and
economic toll.  Sustained innovation is really our only hope for
reducing this toll.  But because Hatch-Waxman, combined with a
far tougher marketplace, has dampened the incentives for R&D
investment significantly over the past 11 years, there is a danger
that less innovation will occur in the future.  The long lead time
between R&D investment and the introduction of new drugs means
that the effect of weak incentives today will be reflected in fewer
new drugs in the future.  A recent survey of leading pharmaceutical
companies conducted by BCG as part of this study suggests that the
share of revenue invested in R&D is expected to decline over the
next four years.  If this, in fact, occurs, the cutbacks will most likely
be made in high-risk categories.  Since these are the areas with the
greatest potential for breakthroughs, a slowdown in research may
deprive society of the next generation of “miracle” drugs.30
Mossinghoff’s statement is important for several reasons. It is clear that the
pharmaceutical industry associates its work with the most moral of pursuits–
reducing the human impact of disease.  However, Mossinghoff makes it clear
that such a pursuit has an economic framework and diseases will only be
researched if the incentive remains high enough to off-set the risk. Accord-
ing to Mossinghoff, a weaker incentive structure caused by competition will
lead to less R&D on life-saving drugs.31  Without strong patent protection,
research for the most devastating of diseases will be ignored and focus will
be put on diseases of the wealthy–like obesity.32
The pharmaceutical industry maintains that only one in 4,000 drugs will
make it to market, and because it will cost millions of dollars for each one, it
is necessary to provide lengthy patent protection to recoup costs.33  However,
the fierce protection of patents is as much about control of the market as it is
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about incentives to research and develop new drugs.  If drug companies
conceded the issue of compulsory licensing and parallel importation, then
vital monopoly control would be lost.  As economics professor Michael
Engelke puts it, “[t]he South African law also would set a precedent that
could lead to weakening of intellectual property laws in more lucrative mar-
kets, which could translate into more losses.”34  Similarly, pharmaceutical
analyst Richard Jarvis argued that “the danger with lots of countries break-
ing patents is not so much the immediate hit to sales–CSK and Roche both
know that most of the money is made in the U.S., Europe, and Japan–but the
loss of market control.”35  Thus, even though sales to the Third World
account for less than 2% of global sales, the industry takes this issue seri-
ously because of the long-term impacts on their ability to monopolize price
controls in the rest of the world.36  The industry has decided to take the hard-
line approach and attempt to resist any possible infringement.  This road
may make sense from an intellectual property perspective, but it leaves the
industry open to claims of heartlessness.
The global pharmaceutical industry argues that the use of parallel imports
and compulsory licensing will result in a significant loss of control. Compul-
sory licensing and parallel importation are therefore strictly regulated.  The
TRIPS Agreement provides patent protection for twenty years, during which
time other entities are not allowed to manufacture the patented material
without the permission of the patent owner.37  Compulsory licensing is a
mechanism through which a government forces a patent owner to license
their patented product to another manufacturer before the expiration of the
patent, presumably so that it may be produced at a cheaper price domesti-
cally.38  TRIPS provides a mechanism for compulsory licensing in Article
31, but it also provides strict rules for the use of compulsory licenses.39  The
U.S. argued that South Africa misinterpreted TRIPS when it passed the South
African Medicines Act.  Instead of moving through the WTO,40 the U.S. took
unilateral action to make South Africa go beyond the protection provided in
TRIPS and change their rules regarding compulsory licensing to better
reflect the pharmaceutical industry’s perspective.41
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Despite the U.S. position on international protection of patents, the
U.S. itself allows compulsory licensing.42  Items that may be subject to com-
pulsory licensing in the United States include many types of military
technology and public health goods.43  The Cipro/anthrax controversy is the
most recent example in the U.S. Cipro is a patented drug owned by the
German pharmaceutical company Bayer.44  Neither American nor Canadian
supplies of Cipro were sufficient to meet demand in the event of an anthrax
epidemic. In response to the heightened sense of risk, the Canadian govern-
ment ordered a million doses of Cipro from a generic drug manufacturer,
violating Bayer’s patent.45  After threatening to follow the lead of the
Canadians,46 the United States government negotiated a reduced price in
order to stockpile enough Cipro for a large attack.47 In this case, the U.S.
used the threat of compulsory licensing to lower the price of a medicine needed
by U.S. consumers.48  The U.S. has ignored this double standard as it works
to protect the interests of U.S. pharmaceutical companies abroad.
There is significant evidence that when generic drugs are available, or
other mechanisms are in place to provide competition, drug prices fall.49
Losing control of the market would open the window for an evaluation of the
pricing structures of many pharmaceutical products.  Part of the rhetorical
strategy of the drug companies has been to divert attention from the prices
they charge for medication, and shift the debate into a framework where brand
name manufacturers are again victims, this time of generic drug manufac-
turers.  As Science Reporter Steve Buist puts it, “[i]n the eyes of the multi-
nationals, these companies are deliberately trying to dodge the rules and suck
the lifeblood from an industry that spends billions and billions of dollars
bringing drugs to market under the protection of worldwide patents.”50  This
line of argument suggests that generic manufacturers, which produce drugs
that have fallen out of patent protection (or in the case of Brazil and India,
produce patented drugs for domestic distribution), are the greedy and
unprincipled ones.51  For example, in March 1998, PhRMA representative
Tom Bombelles suggested that South Africa was a pawn used by India and
Argentina to undermine TRIPS.52  This position shifts the focus away from
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the enormous health crisis in Africa and suggests that in reality, the debate is
really about whom will be able to sell South Africa medication.53
Producers of brand-name pharmaceuticals have also argued that patents
are irrelevant to why Africans do not have access to AIDS medication.  The
industry produced studies that illustrated most AIDS medication was not sub-
ject to patent protection in Africa, so it was impossible for patents to have
caused the problems of access.54  While technically it is true that patent laws
in Africa have had little to do with access to medication, patent laws
elsewhere in the world have made all the difference.  Because most AIDS
medications are patented in the U.S. or Europe, these companies establish
the costs for drugs sold in Africa, regardless of the patent system in Africa.
Because no one, including the world health agencies, seem willing to
challenge the costs of brand name AIDS medications that could be made
available legally under TRIPS, these medications remain outside the reach
of virtually all individuals in Africa.  Instead, health organizations and the
pharmaceutical companies have focused on prevention and education instead
of medication.55
Throughout the debate, pharmaceutical companies have attempted to shift
the focus away from compulsory licensing and parallel importation, and on
to their claim that these actions will destroy the intellectual property system.
They have attempted to shift the focus away from a middle path by continu-
ally asserting the debate is about the protection or destruction of intellectual
property.  They create a dichotomy in which the only positions are for or
against the protection of patents.  However, it is crucial to understand that
the South African government did not void international patent law with the
Medicines Act.  Instead, the South African government argues that the
government should be allowed to produce the needed drugs domestically for
an affordable price through a licensing system; the drug companies still profit
under compulsory licensing.  The very volume of drugs necessary to treat
the AIDS crisis in Africa will produce a substantial profit, even at the
cheapest prices.
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By resisting the pressure to give legitimacy to the ideas of parallel im-
portation and compulsory licensing, the pharmaceutical industry has ensured
that AIDS medications have remained inaccessible to all except the wealthy
few.  Because the industry has been instrumental in structuring international
agreements regarding patent rights, most domestic and international bodies
have been very slow to challenge the pharmaceutical companies.  The
industry seems to have had every reason to believe they would be successful
in their litigation against the South African government. In the next section, I
will provide an overview of the struggle surrounding the South African act
and illustrate how the industry may have lost control over the language of
property rights.
SOUTH AFRICA’S FIGHT FOR AIDS MEDICATION: A BRIEF HISTORY.
1997
 In 1997, thinking that its legislation was consistent with TRIPS and
desperately needing to do something to fight the growing AIDS epidemic,
the South African government passed the South African Medicines and
Related Substances Control Act Amendments.  Of particular interest to the
pharmaceutical companies was Section 15(c), which indicated that the South
African government believed the TRIPS agreement allowed it to legally
engage in compulsory licensing and parallel importation of drugs to provide
access at prices affordable to its citizens if faced with a health crisis.56
The United States feared South Africa might begin to engage in parallel
importation, and circumvent the pricing structure of the pharmaceutical
industry.  However, while the U.S. banned parallel imports in 1987,57 the fact
that drugs are available in Canada and Mexico for prices substantially lower
than those in the U.S. has created significant pressure to allow Americans
easier access to these markets, a practice the pharmaceutical industry
condemns.58 Thus, at the same time the U.S. was resisting the possibility of
parallel imports in South Africa, the U.S. Congress was considering legisla-
tion to make this practice legal in the U.S.59
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The passage of the 1997 Medicines Act sparked immediate condemnation
on the part of the United States Government and the pharmaceutical
industry.  In July of 1997, then Deputy President Mbeki received letters
expressing concern about intellectual property protection from a variety of
U.S. Representatives, including Vice-President Al Gore.60  Numerous
meetings between South African officials, pharmaceutical representatives,
and U.S. officials took place, at which parallel imports and compulsory
licensing were condemned.61  Despite this significant pressure, President
Nelson Mandela signed the amendments into law on December 12, 1997.62
Over the month of January, in response to the new law, the U.S. National
Medical Association, the U.S. National Black Nurses Association, and the
National Black Caucus of State Legislators all wrote letters to President
Mandela expressing concern.63
At the same time the U.S. was expressing concern over the South African
law, the World Health Assembly recommended that “The Revised Drug
Strategy” be adopted.  This resolution requested that member countries
“ensure that public health rather than commercial interests have primacy in
pharmaceutical and health policies and to review their options under the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights to safeguard
access to essential drugs.”64  Thus, while the U.S. and its’ European allies
were condemning the actions of the South African government, the inter-
national health community was beginning to frame the issue in terms of
commercial interests versus human rights.
1998
While controversy continued over the South African law, Brazil began
manufacturing generic AIDS drugs in 1998.  Faced with growing HIV infec-
tions and a relatively poor population, Brazil undertook a massive public
health campaign to provide AIDS medication to all citizens.  To do this,
Brazil began manufacturing generic AIDS drugs, a policy that was success-
ful in reducing infection, halting the spread of HIV, and extending life.65  Thus,
even as the U.S. government allied itself with the pharmaceutical industry
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and continued to champion education over medication, Brazil was providing
a powerful success story utilizing treatment.  It was possible to overcome the
barriers of poverty and an inadequate health care system in the fight against
AIDS.  Brazil’s example gave others in the global south a model to follow.
In 1999, for example, Thailand also attempted to produce generic AIDS drugs,
but quickly ended their plans when the United States threatened to impose
tariffs on Thai goods heading towards the United States.66  Unfortunately,
the Brazil model, despite its success in slowing the rates of death due to
AIDS, has been challenged by the U.S., which began proceedings in the WTO
claiming that Brazil’s patent legislation is a violation of TRIPS.67
Throughout 1998, U.S. diplomats, including Vice-President Al Gore,
continued to pressure South Africa regarding the law.  On February 18, 1998,
the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa, along with
forty-one other national and multinational pharmaceutical companies, filed
a motion in the High Court of South Africa against the South African
government, arguing that Section 15(c) of the Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 was unconstitutional.68  On the
American front, congressmen Mendez and Royce sent a letter to Secretary
of State Madaline Albright requesting that Special 301 status be used against
South Africa in April of 1998.69  According to James Love, in May of 1998,
the USTR placed South Africa on its Special 301 Watch List because of
the Medicines Act70 and in November of 1998, the South African govern-
ment passed a new medicines bill, but the 15(c) provisions were identical to
the original.71
1999
Pressure from the U.S. government and the pharmaceutical industry con-
tinued throughout 1999.  However, because of a unique combination of events,
the pressure became less one-sided and more public.  For several reasons the
AIDS crisis, and South Africa’s battle to provide access to cheap drugs,
became international news.  First, Al Gore was running for President and the
campaign allowed activists to focus public attention on Gore’s role in the
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South African negotiations over the previous three years.72 Second, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) held its talks in Seattle in December of 1999
amidst tens of thousands of protestors.  For the first time, the complex trade
rules that governed the WTO, including TRIPS, were translated into their
real world implications.  Demonstrators were able to clarify that neo-liberal
trade policies were doing little to help the poor or the sick around the world.73
Such enormous political pressure not only disrupted the WTO meeting, but
provided a jump start for the more specific campaign to provide cheap
access to AIDS drugs.  The combination of international media attention on
TRIPS and a U.S. Presidential election allowed AIDS activists to set the stage
for the next series of events.
In April of 1999, just months before the WTO meetings in Seattle, the
USTR placed South Africa on the Watch List again.74  In a press release,
PhRMA supported the USTR policy towards South Africa.75  While both
sides in the South African lawsuit had filed briefs, the trial was delayed in
hopes of negotiating a settlement with the new South African Government
elected in June of 1999.76  The threat of litigation could certainly be inter-
preted as a not-so-subtle incentive to redraft the law.
While the U.S. continued to pressure South Africa, the World Health
Assembly passed a resolution that “declared public health concerns “para-
mount” in intellectual property issues related to pharmaceuticals.”77  Even as
the U.S. State Department was declaring that “all relevant agencies of
the U.S. government . . . have been engaged in an assiduous, concerted cam-
paign to persuade the government of South Africa to withdraw or modify”
their Medicines law, the policy making body of the WHO was taking a stand
in favor of the health concerns of world citizens.78
Despite the fact that activists had been working on the issues of access to
AIDS medications for years, the pressure on the South African government
by the U.S. during an election year gave them an opportunity to bring the
issues to the larger public.  Throughout the summer of 1999, AIDS activists
around the U.S. used the presidential campaign to publicly protest U.S.
actions against South Africa, with a particular focus on the role Al Gore was
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playing in the process. For example, the June 2-8, 1999 edition of the Village
Voice ran an article condemning Gore’s position on patents governing life-
saving medicines.79 In June of 1999, the organization Public Campaign ran a
story on Gore’s financial links with the pharmaceutical industry, document-
ing the campaign money Gore received from the drug industry that, they
argued, explained why he was taking a hard line with South Africa despite
pressure from AIDS activists.80
AIDS activists did not let the pressure off Gore and sponsored protests at
campaign rallies.  ACT-UP was especially influential, and their actions were
in part responsible for the Black Caucus asking Gore to clarify his position
on AIDS medication for South Africa.81  In response to his critics, Gore stated
that he supported “South Africa’s effort to provide AIDS drugs at reduced
prices through compulsory licensing and parallel importing, so long as they
are carried out in a way that is consistent with international agreements.”82
This statement was taken by the Black Caucus to mean that Gore was indeed
in support of cheaper medication for South Africa; yet Gore was careful to
remain committed to the notion that the South African government must
act “legally.”83  At the WTO meetings in Seattle, President Clinton stated
that “the United States will ‘implement . . . trade policies in a manner that
ensures . . . the poorest countries won’t have to go without medicine they so
desperately need.’”84 In private, the U.S. continued to pressure South Africa
to comply with the U.S. interpretation of the TRIPS agreement.
Meanwhile, the activist campaign against Al Gore continued.  ACT-UP
and AIDS Drugs for Africa appeared at Gore events and campaign rallies,
and began linking U.S. policies to race and poverty.85  Eric Sawyer, co-founder
of ACT-UP in New York, said, “Britain and the Netherlands get 8-10 percent
of their drugs through parallel imports, but the United States is not threaten-
ing them with trade sanctions or interfering with their affairs. . . . The U.S. is
doing that only in South Africa, Thailand, and India.  Why?  Is it because
they’re poor countries of people of colour?”86  In August of 1999, an open
letter signed by over 200 people representing expertise around the globe was
sent to Al Gore’s office.87  In August, activists locked Gore out of his office.
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The lock-out was in response to the U.S. compromise that would allow South
Africa to use parallel imports and compulsory licensing for AIDS related
drugs, but for no other type of medication.88  The negotiations only applied
to AIDS drugs, and only to South Africa, leaving other life-saving medicines
out of reach and the rest of Africa to fend for itself.89
In September of 1999, two significant victories for AIDS activists were
publicized.  First, the U.S. government announced that it would back off its
aggressive approach to South Africa, a move attributed directly to the pres-
sure of activists on the administration in a campaign year.90  The second
major victory of September was the suspension of the legal action against
the South African government.  In a press release by PhRMA, the lobbying
organization spun the event as the outcome of negotiations with South Africa
who had agreed to redraft the Medicines Act.91  However, as James Love
points out, despite reports that the new position was possible because South
Africa “backed down,” the only “concession” South Africa made was a
promise that it would adhere to the TRIPS agreement.92  In December of
1999, the U.S. government “announced a more ‘flexible’ U.S. position on
this issue.”93  These victories, while significant, were only a first step.  South
Africa still did not have drugs to administer.
2000
 Because of the visible public relations battle over compulsory licensing
in the South African case, the United States did seem to publicly change its
position in 2000.  As Sara Ford notes,
In the agreement, the United States agreed to relax its trade pres-
sures on South Africa by acknowledging the special circumstances
inherent in the AIDS epidemic.  While both nations reaffirmed their
policy objectives to mutual satisfaction, it is unclear if the United
States’ position actually acknowledged the legality of compulsory
licensing or whether it merely backed down due to harsh political
pressure.94
On May 10, 2000, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13155, which
stated that the U.S. would not pursue unilateral negotiations to pressure
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countries into changing their laws regarding AIDS and access to medication.
However, while the U.S. would not use Special 301 status, it retained the
right to pursue action in the WTO if governments violated the TRIPS
agreement.95  PhRMA immediately responded in a press release, arguing that
the President’s actions “set an undesirable and inappropriate precedent, by
adopting a discriminatory approach to intellectual property laws, and focus-
ing exclusively on pharmaceuticals.”96  Despite the public criticism, on May
11, 2000, five pharmaceutical companies began negotiating price reductions
with African governments in association with UNAIDS.97
Acknowledgement of the impact of AIDS led to two international con-
ferences in 2000.  Both the United Nations Security Council special session
on AIDS and the World AIDS Conference in Durban, South Africa,
highlighted the plight of millions of people around the globe.98  These con-
ferences were essential in clarifying the problems facing Africa.  Despite the
growing global understanding of the depth of the AIDS crisis, and a growing
consensus over the need for AIDS medication (or perhaps because of it), the
pharmaceutical companies reinstated their case against the South African
government in July of 2000, the same month as the Durban conference.99
The activist community began to turn its attention to the Bush campaign.
ACT-UP planned protests outside the Republican National Committee’s
headquarters in Washington, D.C. for October 13, 2000.   AIDS activists were
afraid that Bush’s links with the pharmaceutical industry (like Gore’s)
would influence his policy choices if he were elected.100  Bush’s approach to
HIV/AIDS in Texas had given the AIDS community little assurance that his
leadership on the issue would be progressive.  Despite concerns, the Bush
Administration announced in February of 2001 that it would continue
Clinton’s policy regarding intellectual property in South Africa.101
In October, the prominent international group Medecines Sans Frontieres
(MSF) criticized the WHO approach to AIDS as “not aggressive enough.”102
While the WHO had publicly supported a worldwide effort to halt the spread
of AIDS, it focused on prevention and the availability of medicines to counter
opportunistic infections.103  However, claiming that antiretrovirals were too
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expensive, the WHO stopped short of advocating access to these drugs to
poorer nations.  MSF continued to argue that pharmaceutical companies tend
to invest their research on diseases impacting the wealthy nations of the world,
and that it was up to global government agencies like the WHO to fill the
void and provide cheap medication to African nations.104
While MSF was pursuing a public relations war against the thinness of
the WHO attempt to provide AIDS medication, the Treatment Action Cam-
paign (TAC) decided to engage in civil disobedience.  The Treatment Action
Campaign imported 5,000 capsules of the AIDS drug Biozole into South
Africa in October as part of their campaign “against ‘patent abuse’ and ‘AIDS
profiteering’ by multinational pharmaceutical companies.”105  Because the
South African government had been immobilized by international pressure,
TAC began establishing its own network of doctors and drug manufacturers
to provide cheap drugs to South Africans.106  The drugs were confiscated.107
By December of 2000, the Health GAP Coalition had condemned the joint
venture programs established by UNAIDS and the major pharmaceutical
companies.  While these programs were good public relations for the indus-
try, the program itself was inherently flawed.108  In some cases, prices were
actually more expensive in the pilot programs than before and generic drug
manufactures were kept out of negotiations.109  Meanwhile, Brazil was
able to document a 50% reduction in mortality because of “broad access to
affordable generic antiretroviral medication” and access to “combination
antiretroviral therapy.”110  MSF also published a report card on the UNAIDS
program illustrating how the program was failing and demanding an imme-
diate 95% price reduction in AIDS medication.111
2001
On March 5, 2001, the trial began over the constitutionality of Section
15(c) of the 1997 Act.112  The following day the pharmaceutical companies
were granted a postponement until April 18, 2001.113  Each postponement
delayed the implementation of the Medicines Act, but the debate over the
morality of the issue remained in high gear.
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 Activists had been very successful in highlighting the morality of U.S.
policy choices.  Several important petitions followed the work of activists
from academic quarters.  In March of 2001, six hundred Yale researchers,
including Professor William Prusoff, the original inventor of d4T, petitioned
the University and Bristol-Meyers Squibb to “permit a generic version of its
patented anti-retroviral drug d4T to be imported and distributed in South
Africa.”114  Harvard University faculty followed with a “consensus statement”
on April 4, 2001, in which they asserted that the world AIDS strategy should
focus on medication, as well as education and treatment.115  The Harvard
statement claimed that it was immoral to allow cost to outweigh the lives of
human beings.116  These reports were published during the postponement of
the South African lawsuit.  In February, March, and April, Kofi Annan held
meetings with pharmaceutical representatives, urging the necessity of access
to medication.117
Despite the fact that “most observers” expected the South African law to
be ruled unconstitutional because it was poorly drafted,118 on April 19, 2001
the lawsuit was dropped again due to immense public criticism.119  The hard
work of the Treatment Action Campaign, Medecines Sans Frontieres, Oxfam,
ACT-UP, the Consumer Project on Technology, and Africa Action, had made
a victory for the pharmaceuticals impossible.120  As Roslyn Park pointed out,
the industry did not want to face the possibility that their actual expenditures
and profit margins would be scrutinized during a trial.121
President Bush gave a Rose Garden speech on May 11, 2001, where he
committed $200 million to the global AIDS fund.122  However, Bush was
quick to emphasize that the Global fund must “respect intellectual property
rights, as an incentive for vital research and development.”123  Thus, the frame-
work of intellectual property protection remained in place.  Despite years of
pressure, the U.S. government continued to view the debate through the lens
of intellectual property law.   Public health concerns continued to come second
to protecting intellectual property rights.  Bush’s statements regarding AIDS
and intellectual property were reiterated in June by Under Secretary of State
for Global Affairs, Paula J. Dobriansky at a conference on “Curtailing the
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HIV Epidemic: The Role of Prevention.”124  She indicated that the U.S.
position was that the protection of intellectual property rights provides an
incentive to create.125
In June of 2001, over 10 African countries finished their negotiations with
pharmaceutical companies who were offering reduced pricing in conjunc-
tion with a UNAIDS program.126  Patented AIDS drugs were becoming
available at reduced prices, but availability was still limited to private clinics
and small numbers of people.127   In response to the continued lack of access,
the Treatment Action Campaign and Oxfam called for a global protest against
Pfizer unless it lowered the costs of Diflucan.128
The developing world increased pressure in September when Brazil
threatened to issue a compulsory license against Roche if it would not
provide cheap access to Nelfinavir.129  Brazil was successful in brokering a
deal with Roche.130  In September of 2001, Nigeria began importing
antiretrovirals from Cipla, the Indian-based generic drug manufacturer.131
According to one source, “the pharmaceutical coalition now says it won’t
oppose the South African government’s purchase of low-cost generics and,
in some cases, the multinational companies have said they’d be prepared to
provide the drugs either free or at cost.”132
One could assume that the debate over South Africa’s access to AIDS
medication was essentially over.   At the level of public debate, it seemed like
AIDS activists had been victorious.  Pharmaceutical companies had agreed
to lower prices and provide programs to administer drugs.  But it was under-
stood by those involved that if these concessions from the international
pharmaceutical industry were not followed by revisions to international laws,
the “victory” would be a shallow one.  Therefore, the upcoming WTO
meetings scheduled for September in Doha were of critical concern to AIDS
activists and governments alike.
Doha
The events of September 11, 2001, significantly overshadowed the inter-
national negotiations leading up to the WTO Doha meetings.  In a TRIPS
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Council Special Discussion on Access to Medicines, the developing coun-
tries introduced a draft text they wanted to see endorsed at Doha.  The
proposal argued that TRIPS should be interpreted to “guarantee the ability of
governments to ensure access to affordable medicines.”133  Despite public
assurances by the U.S. government that it would support easier access to
medication, the U.S. position during these negotiations suggested that it
continued to endorse the protection of intellectual property rights at the
expense of public health.  The United States and Switzerland led the resis-
tance at the Special Discussion to changes in TRIPS.  They contended that
there were no problems with the agreement and it did not need clarifica-
tion.134  The U.S. also rejected language that would definitively allow for
governments to take “measures necessary to protect public health.”135
These discussions continued informally on September 21, when
Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand joined the U.S. and Switzerland
in their opposition to a “separate Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and
public health.”136  The United States also “sought to restrict the discussion
and/or any declaration to only medicines for pandemics such as HIV/AIDS.”137
Thus, the U.S. appeared ready to concede that intervention to halt AIDS may
be necessary, but explicitly rejected a larger call for the needs of public health
to supercede intellectual property.  The U.S. position led many developing
country diplomats to question the viability of TRIPS more generally.  As one
diplomat stated, “[i]f we are not even able to agree to address this life and
death issue, the credibility of the TRIPS Agreement is at risk.  Perhaps, in
the near future, we will have to deal with the problem of the TRIPS Agree-
ment as a whole.”138
The irony of the U.S. position at the Special Discussion was that despite
favoring the protection of patent rights over all but the most significant
public health epidemics, it was only a matter of weeks before they were
threatening to disregard Bayer’s patent for Cipro if Bayer did not lower the
cost of Cipro for Americans threatened by anthrax.139  While the U.S. was
arguing that only epidemic diseases justified the subversion of intellectual
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property rights to public health, they were willing to ignore their own state-
ments when less than a dozen Americans became infected with anthrax.
The U.S. lost significant international legitimacy when the overwhelming
hypocrisy of its own efforts regarding anthrax were juxtaposed against the
efforts of developing countries to secure cheap access to AIDS drugs.  For
example, when Brazil pressured Roche into lowering the cost of Nelfanivir,
“the Bush administration and U.S. corporate media accused it of violating
international rules.”140  Because of the anthrax controversy, Doha proved
to be more successful for the developing world than it otherwise would
have been.
Over 60 African, Latin American, and Asian countries, along with
activists from around the globe, came to Doha with the goal of gaining
concessions regarding AIDS medication.141  Despite its threat to Bayer, the
U.S., along with Britain, Switzerland, and Germany came to Doha with a
strong intellectual property agenda.142   Yet the developing world was able to
win some concessions.   In a December 25, 2001 article, The Hindu announced
that the adoption of the Doha Declaration was a victory for countries seeking
cheaper access to AIDS medication.143  The Declaration “concedes that
public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency . . . as provided for in Article 31.”144   The
Declaration gives each country the right to define a national emergency and
affirms that compulsory licenses are an acceptable policy under TRIPS.145
Despite this success, there are flaws with the declaration.  Because it is
not an amendment to TRIPS, the declaration only has moral force.146  Fur-
ther, the wording of the declaration may make it more difficult to actually
amend TRIPS in the future.147  The Doha declaration may allow countries
like India and Brazil, which already have generic drug industries, to con-
tinue to manufacture such drugs after the TRIPS compliance deadline of
2005, but the benefits to countries like South Africa remain unclear.148   While
the issue of compulsory licensing is dealt with in the agreement, parallel
importation is not.149
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The Pharmaceutical industry’s response to Doha was not surprising.
The drug industry opposed the Doha declaration and claimed that giving
developing countries the ability to “promote access to medicines for all” was
irrelevant to the AIDS crisis.  Thomas Bombelles, now representing Merck,
said, “This is a sterile, hypothetical, theological discussion which has
nothing to do with why people are actually dying of AIDS today.”150  Again,
while technically true–people are dying of AIDS today because the global
community has been remiss in addressing the issue—this statement shifts
the focus away from access to medication, a vital piece of the ultimate
solution to the AIDS crisis.
Despite the advances made at the Doha meeting, the situation on the ground
in South Africa did not change much.   Access to AIDS medication remained
difficult.  In response, the Treatment Action Campaign and Medecines Sans
Frontieres again began importing generic AIDS drugs from Brazil.151   While
these generic versions are significantly lower in price than the brand-name
drugs, it may still be a long time before most Africans have access.  Despite
the victories in Doha, the major world health organizations began linking
themselves with the major brand-name pharmaceutical companies instead of
helping fund the distribution of cheaper generic versions.152
The years leading up to Doha were filled with drama and the clash of two
distinct ideas about how to view life-saving drugs.  The extended nature of
this struggle illustrates that it is nowhere near over.  If anything, these events
illustrate how deceiving public officials can be as they announce flexible
programs in public and negotiate for hard-line protection in private.  Without
the dedication of AIDS activists, a challenge to the dominant paradigm of
strong intellectual property law would never have been possible.
In the process of changing the discourse, the activists helped transform
the pharmaceutical industry from self-proclaimed “victim” of international
piracy and theft, into victimizer of the poor and sick around the world.  In
reframing the debate, AIDS activists have made a crucial first step in trans-
forming the world of intellectual property into a more humane one.  In the
final section of this paper I would like to examine the ways in which activists
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were able to create such a powerful counter-discourse, and challenge the
wealthiest conglomeration of corporate power on the planet.
ALTERNATIVES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
The moral force of the pharmaceutical industry as the creator of life-
saving drugs was diminished by the contrary depiction of a greedy and
aggressive industry that placed profits ahead of human life.  By putting
industry actions within a different moral framework, activists were able to
undermine the legal and political superiority of the industry.
In the abstract world of TRIPS, where the implications of monopoly rights
in terms of health are not central to the discussion, the moral discourse of
theft and piracy established by the pharmaceutical industry was successful,
but only as long as it remained in this abstract legalistic world.  Because the
implications of agreements like TRIPS were difficult for the average citizen
to understand, and because much of what was negotiated was done without
full public participation, most Americans and world citizens were unaware
of the implications of TRIPS until after they were passed.  The South
African case was important as a forum for translating the abstract and legal
world of TRIPS into the real world of human lives.
An important result of the process of developing an alternative to intellec-
tual property law was the emergence of a growing global consensus that public
health is a human right that should not be controlled by intellectual property
decisions.153  The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitu-
tion of the World Health Organization, and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been instrumental in defining the
right to health.154  When the World Health Assembly describes access to
medication as a human rights issue, it brings enormous moral weight to the
argument.155  Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has also
weighed in on the side of access to medication by focusing on the role
pharmaceutical companies need to play in providing cheaper drugs to those
suffering from AIDS.156  Gradually, a viable international consensus on the
importance of access to medication and affordable prices has developed and
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this access has been linked to health as a human right.  Within this frame-
work, actions taken by the pharmaceutical industry to protect their patents
seem increasingly immoral.
The Treatment Action Campaign, a South African group, used the language
of health as a human right to help frame the debate over the Medicine Act.
We argue, therefore, that when a conflict arises between human rights
covenants and trade agreements, the rights to life and health-care
take precedence.  In concrete terms, if a government is a signatory
to both the TRIPS agreement and any of the above-mentioned
human rights covenants, by international standards it should be able
to take action to enforce the protection of human rights, even if this
means breaching the TRIPS agreement.  Consequently, human health
should not be subject to international law.157
Aside from connecting the South African case to the larger emerging
consensus on the importance of seeing health as a human right, this argu-
ment also brought international attention to the idea that issues of human
health should not be commodified.  Essential to the activist framework is the
idea that human life should not be viewed through the lens of economic cost-
benefit-analysis.  By positioning the quality and length of human life outside
the rational calculation of risk versus profit, activists rendered many of the
arguments made by the pharmaceutical companies irrelevant.  The TAC
followed their words with deeds.  The acting chairperson of the TAC,
Zachie Achmat, has refused to take HIV medication until it is made publicly
available by the government.158
In a discussion paper for the Treatment Action Campaign, Nathan Geffen
described the shift in perspective towards global human rights and away from
the antagonistic attack on TRIPS:
In an advertisement to the Economist on 28 April, Dr. Harvey Bale,
Director-General of the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association (IFPMA), describes activist groups in
conflict with organization as opponents of globalization.  While TAC
cannot speak for other activist groups, the attempt to caricature us
in this way is quite wrong.  . . .  Indeed, most TAC members are not
HIV/AIDS AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE284
in favor of eradicating the World Trade Organization (WTO), nor
even the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) agreement.  However, unlike spokespersons for the phar-
maceutical industry, TAC is consistent in embracing globalisation.
Fifty-three years ago, the most important global treaty to date was
adopted, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and has since
been ratified by over 140 countries, more than the number of signa-
tories to the WTO.159
According to this perspective, if companies are unwilling to innovate with-
out adequate monopoly protection, then the role of a government ought to be
to protect public health instead of property by providing the necessary
research and development when corporations refuse.  Activists were quick
to point out that the U.S. government already spends considerable money
on R&D that is virtually ignored in the debate over patents.  The
de-commodification of human life requires more than government programs
to provide loans for the purchase of brand-named drugs.160
Within the intellectual property paradigm, a government who sought to
provide cheap access to medication for its citizens was either undermining
TRIPS or endorsing the actions of pirates.  The assertion of the moral
necessity for access to medication has been a long-standing criticism of
TRIPS.  As Sara Ford points out:
Developing nations generally believe that the economic injury com-
plained of by the pharmaceutical companies in developed nations
should have no bearing on the right to receive adequate health care.
For these nations, compulsory licenses should be available for any
health concern where there exists a pharmaceutical capable of
either curing or postponing the disease. Thus, they believe that the
moral exception argument should dictate the broad use and imple-
mentation of compulsory licenses under the TRIPS Article 31.161
With the new and more sympathetic world perspective, this argument
became more than a smokescreen for piracy, as asserted by the pharma-
ceutical industry.
AIDS activists were able to highlight the importance of treatment and
make it a morally required aspect of the campaign to fight AIDS.162  The
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Vice President of the Republic of Malawi, in his keynote speech to the
African Consultation Forum on the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuber-
culosis, and Malaria, summarized the strangeness of the global position on
treatment of AIDS:
It is a paradox that for the majority of diseases in the world, it is
accepted wisdom that disease prevention, care, and treatment should
be addressed in a comprehensive manner as prevention and treat-
ment are complentary and have major public health benefits.  None,
for example would question the wisdom of treating Malaria, Tuber-
culosis or indeed any other common communicable disease.  Indeed
with the exception of childhood immunization, no major disease
control programme focuses on prevention alone.  However, it was
only this year that consensus emerged that there is need to provide
comprehensive treatment for HIV/AIDS.163
Perhaps more than any other claim, the one that creation will wither and
die if not protected by strong intellectual property is the most significant one
to challenge.  Certainly, challenges in the area of software, music, and books
are already making headway.  In the area of pharmaceuticals, the South
African debate opens up the ground for change.  As Cuba’s production of a
Meningitis vaccine indicates, a government with sufficient interest in
protecting public health can do amazing things.164  In the realm of pharma-
ceuticals, there is a viable role for governments to play in creating medica-
tion instead of working to protect patents. Activists for access to AIDS
medication convincingly argued this perspective.
Throughout the events described above, AIDS activists skillfully used
public pressure to gain concessions from the U.S. government and pharma-
ceutical companies that would not have otherwise been made.  Without the
vigilance of AIDS activists, the issues they made public would have been
subsumed by the much better funded public relations campaigns of the
pharmaceutical industry.  Additionally, without the support of developing
governments across the world, as well as the work of NGOs and activists,
concessions at Doha would have been impossible.
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Only when U.S. government actions were framed within the discourse of
human rights was it possible to see an alternative to the strong intellectual
property language.  However, as the Treatment Action Campaign and other
AIDS action groups point out, if they are not vigilant, nothing will stop the
industry from raising prices again.165  While activists were successful in trans-
forming the debate over patents and AIDS medication, there is still work to
do in order to avoid reverting to the status quo.
CONCLUSION: A CAUTIONARY LESSON
The lesson from the events surrounding the South African Medicines Act
are instructive for those interested in alternatives to intellectual property for
a variety of reasons.  First, a committed group of activists were able to
disrupt the political and legal agenda of some of the most powerful corpora-
tions in the world.  Second, a viable human rights discourse centered
on health as a human right was developed to help counter the economic
rationality of the intellectual property rights paradigm.  Third, the moral
terrain surrounding AIDS medication was shifted from framing the pharma-
ceutical industry as the victims of piracy, to people with HIV/AIDS as the
victims of a merciless assertion of patent rights. This was possible when the
abstract world of TRIPS was rendered concrete in the South African case.
Finally, a language of humanitarian care that does not necessarily reject
completely the idea of intellectual property was developed. This language
makes it possible to chart a third path through the polarizing rhetoric of the
pharmaceutical industry.  The development of a third, and more moderate
path, is a significant step along the road to a world where intellectual
property is not overemphasized at the expense of human life.
However, despite these important results, the battle over access to AIDS
medication is not over.  Success has been limited to South Africa and, to a
certain degree, to AIDS medication.  For example, Clinton’s Executive
Order was specific to South Africa, and while the industry has dropped the
lawsuit against the South African government, there is little reason to believe
these companies have adopted the language of access to medication as a
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human right.  While activists have pushed to expand access to all life-saving
drugs, these more general claims have not been globally accepted.  Certainly,
there is a general moral commitment to providing medication, but the nature
of the existing agreements limit access to most medications.
A second reason to be cautious stems from the fact that there has been a
concerted effort on the part of the United States to retreat from the messy
dilemmas imposed by discussing human rights.  Instead, the United States
prefers to discuss the more abstract concept of adhering to the already
established legal regime.  The United States has returned to pursuing patent
claims at the level of the TRIPS agreement where actions can be filtered
through “legal” and “illegal” instead of through their impact on human health.
The language of this discussion is sanitized, avoids the reality of death, and
treats the developing world as infringers who willfully violate the law.
Ultimately, while the seeds for a future effort to transform access to
medication into a human right have been planted, there is still significant
work to be done.   Activists have been successful in developing an alternative
to intellectual property, and though public opinion is on their side, the battle
is long from over.  They continue to argue that the role of government is to
look after the public interest, not the corporate interest of the most rich
and powerful.
The issue of the public interest is at the heart of the question of patents.
What role should government play and what exactly is the “public” the
government ought to protect?  For whatever reasons, in the case of AIDS, the
developing world has taken a stand in favor of its people, while the U.S. has
taken a stand in favor of its corporations.  This division will define the future
of governmental relations as the U.S. attempts to transform the ideological
makeup of the world in favor of “liberal” markets that only consider issues
of public health and welfare through the lens of markets and intellectual
property laws.  The debate is about more than who should own information,
it goes to the very heart of whom government is for and who ought to be
protected.  If the U.S. is successful in defining the public health programs of
India, Brazil, and South Africa as immoral because they do not protect the
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“rights” of corporate citizens, then the democratic principles that serve as
the basis for our constitutional rights will have been seriously undermined.
However, if activists can successfully offer an alternative, we will all live in
a world that is richer, healthier, and more just.
1
 For the full text of 15c see James Love, Pharm-policy posting, [Pharm-policy] Section
15c of the South African Medicines Act (Jan. 23, 2001), at http://lists.essential.org (on
file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
2
 UNAIDS, REPORT ON THE GLOBAL HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 8 (2002).
3
 JOINT UNICEF, UNAIDS SECRETARIAT, WHO/HTP, MSF PROJECT, SOURCES AND PRICES OF
SELECTED DRUGS AND DIAGNOSTICS FOR PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS (2001) at 5, at
http://www.supply.unicef.dk/insideSD/HIVAIDSMay2001.pdf.
4
 Emad Mekay, Pressure Builds for Affordable Life-Saving Drugs, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Nov. 7, 2001.
5
 Theodore C. Bailey, Note, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in
the Development and Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
193, 195–196 (2001).
6
 Steve Buist, Generic AIDS-Drug Makers Weather Global Controversy, HAMILTON
SPECTATOR, July 25, 2001.
7
 Id.
8
 Bailey, supra note 5, at 195–196.
9
 J.M. Spectar, The Hybrid Horseman of the Apocalypse: The Global Aids Pandemic &
the North-South Fracas, 29 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L 253, 260 (Winter 2001) (arguing that
often it is areas like health care and education that are hardest hit by AIDS deaths).
10
 Salih Booker & William Minter, AIDS in Africa: Is the World Concerned Enough?,
GREAT DECISIONS 71, 72 (2002), available at http://www.africaaction.org/action/
aids2002.pdf.
11
 Stephen Lewis, U.N special Envoy for AIDS/HIV in Africa, said on The Nature of
Things, “What in God’s name do you do if you pack up and decide that you can’t do
anything.  I mean, it may be that countries are facing extinction.  While there have been
numbers of heroic interventions by some governments like Botswana, Uganda, Senegal,
we haven’t even scratched the surface of making a difference in Africa.  The Herculean
effort is about to begin.  And I for one, will be darned if I’m not going to be part of the
effort.”  The Nature of Things with David Suzuki: Race Against Time, the HIV/AIDS
Pandemic in Africa (CBC television broadcast, Nov. 27, 2001).
12
 See Anna-Marie Tabor, Recent Development, AIDS Crisis, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515,
515 (2001) (arguing that declines in risk in the U.S. make the subject less reported).
13
 See generally TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND GLOBAL POLITICS: SOLIDARITY
BEYOND THE STATE (Jackie Smith et al. eds., 1997).
14
 RAYMOND W. COPSON, CONG. RES. SERV., AIDS IN AFRICA 9 (CRS Issue Brief, No. IB10050,
updated Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/IB10050.pdf.
15
 Bailey, supra note 5, at 196.  See also JOINT U.N. PROGRAMME ON HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
& WHO, GUIDANCE MODULES ON ANTIRETROVIRAL TREATMENTS, MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION
TO ANTIRETROVIRAL TREATMENTS, U.N. Doc. UNAIDS/98.7 (1998), available at
http://www.who.int/HIV_AIDS/antiretroviral_modules/mod1.doc (citing 1997 level costs
for the most popular AIDS medications).
Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs 289
VOLUME 1  •  ISSUE 2  •  2002
16
 Matthew Kramer, Comment, The Bolar Amendment Abroad: Preserving the Integrity
of American Patents Overseas After the South African Medicines Act, 18 DICK. J. INT’L L.
553, 553 (2001).
17
 Rosalyn S. Park, Note, The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for
South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Patients, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 125, 127 (2002).
18
 Robert Weissman,  A Long, Strange TRIPs: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive
To Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, And The Remaining WTO Legal
Alternatives Available To Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1069,
1075–76 (1996).
19
 Id. at 1076.
20
 Id.
21
 Id. at 1087.
22
 F. M. Scherer, The Law And Economics Of Intellectual Property Rights: The
Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53 VAND. L. REV.
2245, 2248 (2000).
23
 Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GATT, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 227 (1996) (statement of Clayton K. Yeutter, Ambassador).
Ambassador Yeutter is a partner at Hogan & Hartson, L.L.P., which serves as counsel to
Glaxo-Wellcome, Inc.
24
 See generally DEBORA HALBERT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE: THE
POLITICS OF EXPANDING OWNERSHIP RIGHTS (1999) (evaluating the language of victimhood).
25
 The pharmaceutical industry has grown in the past 12 years from under $30 billion
to over $100 billion.  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 23,
at 125 (Statement of John Klein, Chairman of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
Association).
26
 Bailey, supra note 5, at 195 (describing the balance between the industry and AIDS
patients; the debate is often framed in terms of a balance between patients’ rights to medi-
cation and the need to preserve the industry incentive to create more public goods ).
27
 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT 43 (May 2001)
(the first of eight annual reports submitted to Congress by the President), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/regions/africa/growth.shtml (on file with the Seattle Journal for
Social Justice).
28
 Dean Baker, Dying for Patents, Center for Economic Policy & Research (Oct. 29, 2001),
at http://www.cepr.net/columns/baker/dying_for_patents.htm (stating that the National
Institutes of Health, other government funded groups, private foundations and charities
make up a significant amount of the research into life-saving drugs).
29
 Copson,  supra note 14, at 10.
30
 A Decade Later: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Hear-
ing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 125–125 (1996) (statement of
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, President of PhRMA).
31
 Id.  In addition, PhRMA Attorney Charles J. Cooper insisted upon keeping the debate
within the bounds of economic theory during his testimony before the U.S. Congress.  Id.
(statement of Charles J. Cooper, Attorney, PhRMA).  Within this framework, drug
companies retain the moral high ground by being able to claim harms done to them via
generic drug manufacturing and piracy.  They only mention the issue of availability of
medication for people within the framework of R&D.  Their contribution is not medicine,
but research.
HIV/AIDS AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE290
32
 Carl Mortished, Medical Patent is Bitter Pill for WTO Delegates, TIMES (London),
Nov. 5, 2001, at 23.
33
 Bailey, supra note 5, at 197.
34
 Karine Cunqueiro, Hostile AIDS Activists Target Gore Over Patents, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, July 18, 1999, at http://www.ipsnews.net/search.shtml.
35
 Leo Lewis, Can Drug Giants Swallow this Bitter Pill?  As Brazil Threatens to Copy
the AIDS Drug Viracept, Leo Lewis Asks how Pharmaceutical Research will Survive,
INDEPENDENT ON SUNDAY (London),  Aug. 26, 2001, at 3.
36
 Richard Gwyn, Big Drug Companies, Shameful Profits, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 7,
2001, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views01/0307-03.htm.
37
 See Kramer, supra note 16, at 560–61 (defining the controversy of compulsory licenses).
38
 Id. at 561.
39
 See John A. Harrelson, Note, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS
Crisis:  Finding the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compas-
sion, 7 WID. L. SYMP. J. 175, 181–82 (2001) (describing compulsory licenses but arguing
that in the case of pharmaceuticals it is not possible to use compulsory licenses under the
TRIPS agreement).
Article 31 allows a member nation to offer compulsory licenses to the govern-
ment or third parties under limited circumstances.  Subject to Article 31(b),
compulsory licenses can be imposed only for domestic use and restrictions
exist on the process of granting such licenses.  In order to grant a compulsory
license under the TRIPS Agreement, each case must be considered separately
on its merits.  In addition, efforts must be made to obtain permission of the
patent owner.  This requirement may be waived in the case of a national
emergency.  A patent owner must also receive adequate compensation.  The
granting of compulsory licenses and the remuneration given is subject to
judicial review.  The license must be terminated when the original need for the
compulsory license no longer exists. The WTO cautions that the compulsory
license conditions ‘should be read together with the related provisions of
Article 27.1, which require that patent rights shall be enjoyable without
discrimination as to the field of technology, and whether products are imported
or locally produced.  Thus, a general requirement to allow compulsory
licensing for a field, such as pharmaceuticals, appears to be outside what is
allowed under TRIPS.
Id.
40
 See Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharma-
ceuticals in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 137, 146 (2001) (suggesting that the U.S. did not utilize the WTO
dispute resolution framework because they knew the South African legislation did not
technically violate TRIPS).  But see Scherer, supra note 22, at 2252 (suggesting that
WTO action was avoided because of activist pressure on Gore during the campaign).
41
 Harrelson, supra note 39, at 184.
42
 Id. at 191.
43
 Id.
44
 Patent Problems Pending, ECONOMIST, Oct. 27, 2001.
45
 Id.
46
 Id.
47
 France Suggests U.S. Double Standards over Generic Drugs, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS,
Nov. 2, 2001.
Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs 291
VOLUME 1  •  ISSUE 2  •  2002
48
 See id. (because of its negotiating power, the U.S. was successful in getting Bayer to
lower the cost of Cipro from $1.77 per tablet to 95 cents).
49
 See Weissman, supra note 18, at 1116–17 (arguing that the evidence overwhelmingly
supports the position that competition equals cheaper drugs).
50
 Buist, supra note 6.
51
 See id. (quoting former Ontario health minister about the generic drug industry only
going after the biggest markets).
52
 Love, supra note 1.
53
 Mortished, supra note 32 (arguing that India and Brazil are arguing for reduced patent
protection because of their own self-interest in protecting their generic drug industries).
There is no evidence to suggest India manipulated South Africa, only that these countries
share a similar perspective regarding the inequitable impact of intellectual property on
access to medication.  By blaming the Indian government as Bombelles does, the claim
could be made that the South African controversy was really an issue of manipulative
generic companies using the AIDS crisis to maximize their own profits at the expense of
the brand-name industry.
54
 John Donnelly, Patents Reportedly Do Not Cut AIDS Drug Access Study on Africa
Cites Dearth of Global Aid, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 17, 2001, at A3.
55
 See infra text accompanying note 163.
56
 James Love, Appendix B: Time-Line of Disputes over Compulsory Licensing and
Parallel Importation in South Africa, Aug. 5, 1999, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/
sa/sa-timeline.txt  (A more detailed timeline of the communications that surrounded the
change in the law can be found in James Love’s timeline, which is available at the
Consumer Project on Technology website.  I rely quite heavily on this timeline and
Love’s excellent archival information surrounding this controversy).
57
 William Davis, Comment, The Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000: Releasing
Gray Market Pharmaceuticals, 9 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 483, 485 (2001).
58
 Id. at 485.  (Congress, in response to the cheap availability of drugs across both
borders, introduced the Medicine Equity and Drug Safety Act of 2000.  This legislation
suggests that members of the U.S. Congress believe it is time to reevaluate the differ-
ential price of drugs as well).
59
 Dolmo, supra note 40, at 146–47 (pointing out that numerous U.S. Congress people are
looking into the possibilities of parallel importation for pharmaceuticals to decrease drug
costs in the United States).
60
 Love, supra note 56.
61
 Id.
62
 Id.
63
 Id.
64
 Id.
65
 Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
66
 Harrelson, supra note 39, at 185–86.  The U.S. government later backed down from its
position against Thailand and the country was able to produce medication.
67
 Park, supra note 17, at 141.
68
 Applicant’s Notice of Motion, In the matter between Pharm. Mfg. Ass’n.  S. Africa
et. al and Mandela et. al, High Court of South Africa (1998) (No. 4183/98).   In part, the
applicants argued that the Act was unconstitutional because it failed to “facilitate public
involvement in the legislative process by which the Amendment Act was passed; conduct
its business in an open manner; take into consideration the recommendations made to the
Portfolio Committee on Health [National Assembly] and the Select Committee on Social
Services [Council of Provinces] by the public, and, in particular; pay attention to scien-
HIV/AIDS AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE292
tific, medical, pharmaceutical and legal submissions made to the aforesaid committees
by members of the public, including the Applicants . . .”  Id.
69
 Love, supra note 56.
70
 Id.
71
 Id.
72
 Id.
73
 Even before Seattle, these ideas were beginning to bubble to the surface.  See DAVID
KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (Berrett-Koehler Publishers 1995).
74
 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Announces Results of
Special 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999) (on file with Seattle Journal for Social
Justice).  The USTR stated, “South Africa’s Medicines Act appears to grant the Health
Minister ill defined authority to issue compulsory licenses, authorize parallel imports,
and potentially otherwise abrogate patent rights. . . . We call on the Government of South
Africa to bring its IPR regime into full compliance with TRIPS before the January 1,
2000 deadline, ensure that all Government offices use only legitimate software, and clarify
that the powers granted in the Medicines Act are consistent with its international obliga-
tions and will not be used to weaken or abrogate pharmaceutical patent protection. We
will continue to address these issues with the South African Government and will
conduct an out-of-cycle review of South Africa’s progress towards addressing these
concerns in September 1999.”  Id.
75
 Press Release, Pharmeceutical Research and Manufacturing Association, PhRMA
Supports USTR on South Africa, (Apr. 30, 1999).
76
 PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCHERS & MFG. OF AM., SUBMISSIONS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
RESEARCHERS AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA FOR THE NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT
ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: SOUTH AFRICA (1999), available at http://www.cptech.org/
ip/health/phrma/nte-99/safrica.html.
77
 Robert Weissman, AIDS and Developing Countries: Democratizing Access to
Essential Medicines, 4 FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS 23 (Aug. 1999) available at
http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n23aids.html.
78
 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT, U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE THE REPEAL,
TERMINATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF ARTICLE 15(C) OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MEDICINES AND
RELATED SUBSTANCES ACT OF 1965 (Feb. 5, 1999) available at  http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html.
79
 James Ridgeway, Gore AIDS Scandal – Helps Drug Companies Nix Cheap Medicines,
THE VILLAGE VOICE, June 2–8, 1999, available at http://lists.essential.org/random-bits/
msg00107.html  (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
80
 Al Gore, AIDS Drugs and Pharmaceutical Money,  OUCH! #25, June 16, 1999, avail-
able at http://www.publicampaign.org/ouch6_16_99.html  (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
81
 Sonya Ross, Gore Faces S. Africa AIDS Dilemma, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at
http://www.aegis.com/news/ap/1999/AP990616.html  (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
82
 Id.
83
 Id.
84
 Harrelson, supra note 39, at 186.
85
 Cunqueiro, supra note 34.
86
 Id.
87
 Press Release, Treatment-Access, Activists Lock Gore Out of His Office (Aug. 25,
1999) available at http://www.hivnet.ch:8000/topics/treatment-access/viewR?574 (on
file with Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
88
 Id.
89
 Id.
Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs 293
VOLUME 1  •  ISSUE 2  •  2002
90
 See Ed Vulliamy & David Beresford, South Africa Beats U.S. Over Costs of AIDS
Drugs, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 21, 1999, available at http://www.q.co.za/news/1999/9909/
990921-uspolicy.htm (on file with Seattle Journal for Social Justice).  In addition, in a
p r e s s
release from the USTR, the U.S. government announced that this decision came in
response to an agreement reached where the South African government made a new
commitment to protecting intellectual property law.  Press Release, Office of the United
States Trade Representative, U.S. - South Africa Understanding on Intellectual Property,
(Sept. 17, 1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1999/09/99-76.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2002).
91
 Press Release, PhRMA, Drug Companies Suspend Action Against South African Law
(Sept. 9, 1999) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
92
 James Love, Five Common Mistakes by Reporters Covering U.S./South Africa Disputes
Over Compulsory Licensing and Parallel Imports, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., Sept. 23,
1999, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/mistakes.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2002).
93
 Press Release, ACT UP, AIDS Activists to Target Bush on Mass Protest Friday the 13th,
(Oct. 10, 2000), available at http://www.africaaction.org/docs00/drug0010.htm (on file
with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
94
 Sara M. Ford, Comment, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPs Agree-
ment: Balancing Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 955–956 (2000).
95
 Exec. Order No. 13155, Fed. Reg. 30,521–23 (May 12, 2000).
96
 Statement from Alan F. Holmer, President, PhRMA, issued in response to President
Clinton’s May 10, 2000 Executive Order on Access to HIV/AIDS Pharmacuticals (May
2000) (on file with the Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
97
 COPSON, supra note 14, at 9; see also Position Paper by Health GAP Coalition
Presented at UNAIDS meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Questioning the UNAIDS/Pharmaceu-
tical Industry Initiative: Seven Months and Counting . . . (Dec. 13, 2000), available at
http://www.globaltreatmentaccess.org.
98
 Tabor, supra note 12, at 516.
99
 Pharmaceutical Companies Reinstate South African Legal Challenge, 1 S. AFRICA-
EUROPE TRADE & DEV. UPDATE 2, Sept. 2000, available at http://www.africaaction.org/
docs00/drug0010.htm.
100
 ACT UP, supra note 93.
101
 COPSON, supra note 14, at 10.
102
 Press Release, ACT UP, WHO’s “Massive Effort” is not Aggressive Enough says
Medecins Sans Frontieres (Oct. 4, 2000) (on file with Seattle Journal for Social Justice).
103
 Id.
104
 Id.
105
 Marjolein Harvey, Government has two Weeks Legalise Generic AIDs Drug – TAC,
ALLAFRICA.COM, Oct. 20, 2000, at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/
200010200316.html.  (Site lasted visited Nov. 5, 2002).
106
 Id.
107
 Id.
108
 Health Gap Coalition, supra note 97.
109
 Id.
110
 Id.
111
 Press Release, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Six-Month Report Card: Have AIDS Drugs
Prices for the Poor Been Slashed? (Dec. 1, 2000) (on file with Seattle Journal for
Social Justice).
112
 Consumer Project on Technology, Africa: Disputes Involving Intellectual Property and
HIV/AIDS AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY
SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE294
Health Care, at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/africa/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2002).
113
 Id.
114
 Press Release, Yale Researchers Demand that University, Bristol-Meyers Squibb Give
Up Patent Rights to AIDS Drugs, Federation News (Mar. 16, 2001), available at
http://www.yaleunions.org/news/PR.htm#joint.
115
 Gregor Adams et. al., Consensus Statement on Antiretroviral Treatment for AIDS in
Poor Countries By Individual Members of the Faculty of Harvard University, Nov. 19,
2001, available at http://www.tac.org.za (arguing that there are many compelling
reasons to focus on treatment despite the fact that it may cost).
116
 COPSON, supra note 14, at 10.
117
 Barbara Cochrane Alexander, Lack of Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs in Developing
Countries: Is There a Violation of the International Human Right to Health?, 8 No. 3
HUM. RTS. BRIEF 12, 12 (Spring 2001).
118
 Richard Gwyn, Big Drug Companies, Shameful Profits, TORONTO STAR, March 7, 2001.
119
 Buist, supra note 6, at A1.
120
 [ . . . ]
121
 Park, supra note 17, at 147–148.
122
 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President During Announcement of
Proposal for Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, U.S. Department of State  (May 11, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm/index.cfm?docid=2869.
123
 Id.
124
 Paula J. Dobriansky, The Fight Against HIV/AIDS: The Bush Administration’s
Integrated Approach, Remarks to a Conference on Curtailing the HIV Epidemic: The
Role of Prevention (June 22, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2001/
index.cfm?docid=4147.
125
 Id.
126
 COPSON, supra note 14, at 9.
127
 Id.
128
 SA AIDS Groups Call for Global Protest Against Pfizer, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS
ASSOCIATION (July 19, 2001); Calls for Pfizer to Cut Drugs Cost, SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS
ASSOCIATION (July 19, 2001).
129
 John Donnelly, Brazil Wins Big Price Cut in AIDS Drug Trade-Law Tactic Could Be
Model, Health Chief Says, BOSTON GLOBE, at A1 (Sep. 1, 2001).
130
 Id.
131
 COPSON, supra note 14, at 10.  See also Kate Miller, AIDS Epidemic Underscores
Impact of Discrimination:  UNAIDS, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 5, 2001.
132
 Buist, supra note 6.
133
 Joint Press Release, Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF), Oxfam and Third World
Network, TRIPS Council Special Discussion on Access to Medicines, Sep. 19, 2001,
available at http://www.africapolicy.org.
134
 Id.
135
 Id.
136
 Cecilia Oh, Report on TRIPS Council Special Discussion on Access to Medicines
(September 19, 2001) and TRIPS Informal Meeting, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Sept. 21,
2001, available at http://www.africapolicy.org.
137
 Id.
138
 Id.
139
 ECONOMIST, supra note 44.
140
 Mekay, supra note 4.
141
 Id.
Moralized Discourses: South Africa’s Intellectual Property Fight for Access to AIDS Drugs 295
VOLUME 1  •  ISSUE 2  •  2002
142
 Mortished, supra note 32.
143
 Dubey, Implications of Doha for India - II, HINDU, Dec. 25, 2001.
144
 Id.
145
 Id.
146
 Id.
147
 Id.
148
 Celia W. Dugger, A Catch-22 on Drugs for the World’s Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2001, at W1.
149
 Geoff Dyer, Activists Point to Flaws in Declaration of Drug Patents, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), Nov. 16, 2001, at 13.
150
 Id.
151
 Sarah Boseley, Aids Drugs Bring Hope to South Africa, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 30,
2002, at 14.
152
 Id.
153
 NATHAN GEFFEN, TREATMENT ACTION CENTER (TAC), PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC 4 (May 2001) (Discussion document presented to
the World Business Council for Sustainable Development Project on Innovation and Tech-
nology, Workstream on Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology and Information
Technology), available at http://www.tac.org.za/.
154
 Alexander, supra note 117, at 13  (Arguing for an interpretation of health as a universal
human right).
155
 It is important to note that the United States was the only veto on the UN Human
Rights Commission declaration on access to medication to treat HIV/AIDS.  Park, supra
note 17, at 151.
156
 Alexander, supra note 117.
157
 GEFFEN, supra note 153, at 7.
158
 IT’S MY LIFE (First Run Icarus Films 2001).
159
 GEFFEN, supra note 153, at 3.
160
 Harrelson, supra note 39, at 186.  Such a program has several obvious flaws from an
activist point of view.  First, it does nothing to challenge the high cost of these drugs in
Africa and perpetuates the injustice inherent in the pricing structure.  Second, such an
action acts as a subsidy for the pharmaceutical companies that are already making
millions on medication.  Third, Africa doesn’t need additional loans.  In fact, the burden
of debt has made it impossible for Africa to effectively fight AIDS in the first place.
161
 Ford, supra note 94, at 964.
162
 The Harvard Consensus statement on the moral reasons for providing AIDS medica-
tion helped clarify the point that despite the economic costs, treatment was a necessary
part of a viable AIDS strategy.  Adams et al., supra, note 115.
163
 The Right Honorable Justin Malewezi, Vice President of Malawi, Statement at
The Consultation Forum on Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(Nov. 12–13, 2001), available at http://www.africaaction.org/.
164
 Sandra W. Key & Daniel J. DeNoon, Cuba Upbeat on Vaccine Deal, WORLD DISEASE
WEEKLY PLUS, Sept. 9, 1999, at 17.
165
 GEFFEN, supra note 153, at 18.
For updated information on this topic, visit www.law.seattleu.edu.
– Eds.
